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The	dialogue	between	artistic	development	work	and	philo­
sophical	aesthetics	is	a	dialogue	between	very	different	part­
ners.	On	the	one	hand,	artistic	development	work	seeks	to	
open	new	windows	of	opportunity	and	show	us	something	
we	have	never	seen	before.	On	the	other,	philosophical	aes­
thetics	must	insist	that	not	everything	that	is	new	is	art.	
Historically	speaking,	aesthetics	has	consistently	sought	to	
lay	down	rules	for	what	is	valid	art	–	and	these	rules	have	
been	consistently	broken	by	works	possessing	their	own	vali­
dity.	Works	that	gave	reflection	the	task	of	understanding	
the	characteristic	features	of	their	own	specific	and	unique	
nature,	rather	than	assuming	theoretical­philosophical	sup­
port.	In	other	words,	theoretical	reflection	has	consistently	
been	challenged	to	change	the	current	sets	of	rules	in	order	
to	understand	the	new	and	the	different;	and	we	have	con­
sistently	learnt	things	throughout	history	that	only	artistic	
experiment	could	teach	us.	But	philosophical	aesthetics	has	
never	surrendered	its	hesitant	reservations,	based	on	the	ex­
perience	that	much	that	is	new	proves	not	to	be	art.	And	
I	believe	that	this	is	where	its	tradition	and	continued	rele­
vance	can	be	found,	which	must	still	be	considered	when	
rules	need	to	be	changed	even	today.
The	traditions	of	philosophical	aesthetics	certainly	date	
back	to	Plato	at	least:	in	Plato	we	find	a	determined	insistence	
that	not	everything	is	art.	In	fact,	Plato	seems	to	believe	that	
what	we	call	art	often	contain	a	dangerous,	misleading	form	
of	seduction	which	philosophical	aesthetics	was	born	to	ex­
pose.	And	this	insistence	and	doubt	is	worth	remembering	
and	understanding	in	a	post­modern	culture	of	images,	
challenged	by	spectacular	acts	of	terror	in	which	passenger	
planes	are	launched	at	skyscrapers,	videos	are	broadcast	
showing	hostages	being	decapitated,	or	child	pornography	
is	published	on	the	internet.	
We	need	critical	reflection	–	and	we	need	art	and	artistic	
development	work	to	ensure	that	we	do	not	fool	ourselves	
into	believing	that	we	can	lay	down	rules	once	and	for	all	
governing	what	constitutes	valid	artistic	expression,	there­
by	trapping	ourselves	in	a	Platonic	state.
Umberto	Eco	understands	the	problem	and	its	comp­
lexity	very	well,	indicating	in	his	Poetics of the Open Work 
that	the	rule­less,	subjective	and	open	
was	noticed	by	classical	writers,	especially	when	they	set	
themselves	to	consider	the	figurative	arts.	In	the	Sophist	Pla­
to	observes	that	painters	suggest	proportions	not	by	follow­
ing	some	objective	canon	but	by	judging	them	in	relation	
to	the	angle	from	which	they	are	seen	by	the	observer.1
Plato	reflected	a	long	time	ago	on	open,	experimental	art,	
engaged	in	the	creation	of	illusion	and	a	pleasure	to	the	
eyes,	so	he	can	be	included	in	Eco’s	attempt	to	establish	a	
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form	of	poetics	for	the	open	work	that	unfolds	and	comes	
to	life	as	it	is	perceived.	However,	as	mentioned	above,	Eco	
is	aware	that	the	problem	is	complex,	and	that	Plato	was	
not	immediately	prepared	to	allow	art	and	its	experiments	
and	illusions	to	determine	the	validity	of	such	experiments	
without	closer	consideration.	Eco	points	out	that	the	atten­
tion	paid	to	the	ruleless,	subjective,	illusory	and	open	was	
not	regarded	by	Plato	as	a	reason	to	change	the	rules	he	
mastered.	Instead,	he	saw	all	the	more	reason	to	insist	on	
the	things	that	rules	could	determine	and	maintain:	
Yet	it	is	equally	certain	that	this	awareness	has	led	to	a	ten­
dency	to	operate	against	the	“openness”	of	the	work,	to	favor	
its	“closing	out”.2
I	shall	return	in	a	moment	to	Eco	and	his	continuing	his­
torical	outline	of	the	dialogue	between	art	and	reflection,	
something	which	is	far	from	irrelevant	to	his	project	and	
the	point	he	tries	to	make.	But	first	I	should	like	to	dwell	on	
the	reasoning	contained	in	The Sophist in	order	to	point	out	
the	forms	of	expression	that	Plato	refuses	to	call	art.	Later	in	
this	article	this	will	serve	as	a	useful	piece	in	the	jigsaw	of	not	
only	understanding	why	the	Renaissance	humanists	–	who	
invented	and	worshipped	the	illusory	perspective	which	
unfolded	behind	the	surface	of	the	screen	to	a	presumed	
observer	located	in	front	of	this	surface	–	could	also	regard	
themselves	justifiably	as	Platonists;	but	also	understanding	
what	kind	of	spatial	awareness	these	Renaissance	Platonists	
share	with	Plato.	I	hope	this	will	enable	me	to	indicate	the	
areas	in	which	artistic	development	work	and	philosophical­
aesthetic	reflection	can	utilise	each	other	today	in	creating	
and	exploring	in	a	mutual,	critically	inspired	dialogue.
As	pointed	out	by	Eco,	in	The Sophist we	encounter	a	
form	of	art	known	as	illusory art which	takes	the	observer	
into	account	and	is	content	to	mime	a	similarity	between	
the	objects	it	represents,	without	regard	for	the	proportions	
of	these	objects.	But	this	is	not	the	only	form	of	art	dealt	
with	in	The Sophist.	In	fact	the	dialogue	distinguishes	bet­
ween	illusory art	on	the	one	hand,	and	copying art on	the	
other,	which	“is	made	to	reproduce	the	proportions	of	the	
original	in	length,	breadth,	and	depth.”3	In	the	dialogue	
copying art	is	actually	presented	first	–	after	which	there	is	
a	discussion	of	whether	all	forms	of	art	do	the	same	(rep­
resenting	the	correct	proportions	of	things).	The	answer	to	
this	question	reveals	that	there	is	also	a	form	of	art	that	is	
only	an	illusion,	miming	similarity,	and	that	according	to	
Plato	this	illusory art	should	be	disdained	because	it	does	
not	observe	objective	rules	about	the	similarity	(homeoisis)	
between	presentation	and	representation,	or	about	concor­
dance	between	objective	rules.	In	addition,	it	is	relevant	for	my	
argument	to	point	out	that	the	answer	also	reveals	that	the	
illusory art	that	Plato	despises	creates	the	illusion	of	space	
in front of or	on a	surface,	and	not (as	seen	in	the	subse­
quent	Platonic	Renaissance)	behind the	picture	plane.	In	
other	words,	I	feel	it	is	worth	noting	that	Plato’s	rejec­
tion	of	illusory art	is	due	partly	to	the	fact	that	perspective	
creating	space	behind	the	picture	plane	had	still	not	been	
discovered	in	Antiquity;	so	the	example	of	illusory art	in	
The Sophist	is	a	large	surface	which	requires	(out	of	consid­
eration	for	the	observer)	manipulation	of	the	proportions	
of	the	forms	painted	at	the	top	and	bottom	on the	surface.	
Or,	as	expressed	in	The Sophist	in	answer	to	the	question	of	
whether	all	art	does	not	present	homeoisis:	
Not,	as	I	should	say,	by	those	who	have	to	model	or	paint	
colossal	figures.	Were	they	to	reproduce	their	true	propor­
tions,	the	upper	parts	of	the	figures,	you	know,	would	appear	
too	small,	and	the	lower	too	large,	as	we	have	to	view	the	first	
from	a	distance,	but	the	others	at	close	range.4
As	indicated	above,	I	will	shortly	return	to	the	issue	of	why	
the	difference	–	and	similarity	–	between	the	art	Plato	re­
jects	and	the	perspective	of	the	Renaissance	is	significant.
Inspired	by	Eco’s	further	presentation	of	the	history	
of	the	open	work,	and	initially	by	his	point	that	the	early	
Christian	medieval	Platonists	developed	a	theory	of	al­
legory	
which	posited	the	possibility	of	reading	the	Scriptures	(and	
eventually	poetry,	figurative	arts)	not	just	in	the	literal	sense	
but	also	in	three	other	senses:	the	moral,	the	allegorical,	and	
the	anagogical5
it	is	tempting	to	consider	whether	Plato,	too,	can	be	read	
and	understood	in	ways	other	than	the	literal.	In	other	
words,	the	question	is	whether	the	literal	interpretation	of	
Plato	which	I	have	just	presented	inspired	by	Eco	can	be	
supplemented	by	e.g.	other	less	literal	and	more	physically	
or	bodily	attentive	interpretations.	And	the	inspiration	for	
such	interpretations	comes	less	from	medieval	allegory	and	
more	from	forms	of	art	that	can	be	characterised	as	ancient	
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–	but	which	have	only	attracted	the	attention	of	art	history	
within	the	past	20–30	years.	In	other	words,	the	question	
is	whether	installation	and	performance	art	can	inspire	us	
to	less	literal	interpretations	of	Plato	–	whether	attention	to	
the	installatory	and	the	performative	respectively,	which	in	
my	opinion	is	effective	but	not	thematised	in	the	Platonic	
linguistic	universe,	and	which	has	therefore	rarely	attracted	
the	attention	of	more	literal	interpretations	of	Plato,	can	
help	us	to	understand	that	the	space	developed	in	the	Re­
naissance	in	extension	of	Plato	and	medieval	Platonists	can	
be	characterised	as	both	Euclidian	and installatory:	the	per­
spective	system,	after	all,	is	an	installation	with	a	vanishing	
point,	surface/mirror	and	a	point	of	observation.	And	in	
this	connection	perhaps	we	can	indicate	how	it	is	possible	
to	approach	other	more	performatively	inspired	spaces	as	we	
experience	them	in	e.g.	Manierism,	the	Baroque,	moder­
nity	and	in	our	own	era,	and	which	have	still	only	vaguely	
been	satisfactorily	thematised	and	reflected	in	and	with	the	
theory.
In	her	excellent	summary	entitled	“I/Eye/Oculus:	per­
formance,	installation	and	video”6,	Kristine	Stiles	empha­
sises	that	recent	performance	and	installation	art	has	ancient	
roots	in	its	focus	partly	on	kinesis	or	movement	instead	of	
stasis,	and	partly	on	facticity,	concretion	or	presentation	
instead	of	mimesis	and	representation.	But	she	also	points	
out	that	these	art	forms	have	never	been	either	thematised	
or	understood	by	the	predominant	form	of	philosophical	
aesthetics,	which	without	reflection	seems	to	assume	that	
stasis	and/or	mimesis	are	criteria	of	true	art.	As	indicated,	we	
cannot	accuse	Plato	of	wishing	to	defend	mimetic	art	–	he	
seems	to	be	primarily	occupied	by	static,	unchanging	eternity,	
which	the	miming	senses	distort	in	critical	fashion.	But	
Aristotle	understands	art	as	mimesis.	And	in	his	influen­
tial	Poetics,	Aristotle	inspires	Alberti	and	the	Renaissance,	
among	others,	to	understand	the	space	behind	the	picture	
plane	as	a	stage	on	which	stories	(storia)	of	universal,	ahis­
torical	validity	can	be	shown	in	a	static,	eternal	present.	
The	Renaissance	space,	of	course,	is	an	articulation	of	the	
eternal	and	unchanging	–	and	the	Renaissance	city,	also	a	
stage,	represents	this	eternity,	too.
Inspired	by	Eco	and	his	point	that	the	early	Christian	me­
dieval	Platonists	developed	ways	of	understanding	the	Holy	
Scriptures	that	were	not	literal,	it	is	possible	to	consider	
(as	indicated	above)	what	it	means	that	we	read	Plato	with	
art	instead	of	merely	reading	art	with	Plato,	and	thereby	
explore	both	the	installatory	and	the	performative	in	Plato’s	
writings.	I	do	not	pretend	that	this	enables	us	to	transcend	
the	closed,	limited	and	specific	in	Plato;	but	we	do	gain	an	
understanding	other	than	a	literally	Platonic	understand­
ing	of	how	the	dialogue	between	art	and	reflection	has	de­
veloped	over	time,	and	thus	of	how	dialogue	could	work	
today,	with	specific	focus	on	dialogue	itself,	on	exchange	
and	movement.	Because	as	I	will	seek	to	show,	dialogue	is	
best	(and	best	understood)	if	we	acknowledge	that	philosoph­
ical	aesthetics	also	has	a	compositional	plane	which	bears	
reflection,	the	literal.	That	in	other	words	it	is	in	our	atten­
tion	to	the	compositional,	and	thus	to	what	philosophical	
aesthetics	learns	from	art,	that	we	not	only	transcend	the	
limitations	that	a	simply	literal	interpretation	of	philoso­
phy	and	art	results	in,	but	also	establish	the	opportunity	for	
continued,	mutual	inspiration	between	unequal	parties.	
Between	on	the	one	hand	art,	which	composes	space	and	
time,	and	on	the	other	what	Eco	inspired	by	the	medieval	
Platonists	calls	“the	creative	logos”7.
Attention	to	the	composition	of	Plato’s	texts,	or	to	be	
more	accurate	his	dialogues,	reveals	immediately	that	what	
is	involved	is	carefully	composed	performance	or	dramatic	
art,	which	Plato	himself	(for	instance	in	the	dialogue	en­
titled	Ion)	does	not	fail	to	condemn	as	seduction.	And	
throughout	Plato’s	works	we	encounter	a	diligent	and	pre­
cise	use	of	images	and	metaphors	to	explain	that	only	the	
literal,	unambiguous	concept	is	in	contact	with	the	truth.	
In	fact	Plato	does	not	seem	able	to	explain	or	show	us	the	
truth	–	not	just	the	truth	about	the	lies	of	images,	but	truth	
itself	–	without	using	images	and	metaphors.	The	famous	
cave	picture from	The Republic VI is	both	a	metaphor	and	
a	carefully	described	installation.	There	is	fire,	objects	that	
are	moved	and	illuminated	by	the	fire,	a	number	of	observ­
ers,	a	wall,	and	the	shadows	of	the	objects	on	the	wall.	Plato,	
of	course,	wishes	to	use	this	installation	to	show	us	once	
again	that	we	cannot	trust	our	senses;	as	such	the	literal	
meaning	of	the	cave	picture	is	clear	and	in	accordance	with	
The Sophist’s	rejection	of	illusory art.	But	there	is	no	doubt	
that	what	inspired	the	early	Christian	Platonists	was	the	
installatory	and the	performative	in	Plato’s	presentation	of	
the	truth:	the	idea	that	we	should	move	out	of	the	cave	and	
up	into	the	light	to	reach	the	truth	inspired	the	medieval	
anagogical	understanding	of	truth	which	Eco,	as	quoted	
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above,	mentions	among	the	non­literal	interpretations	of	
the	Holy	Scriptures	of	the	era.	The	anagogical,	of	course,	
subsequently	became	very	important	for	the	composition	
of	scholastic	books	and	Gothic	cathedrals	–	both	of	which	
were	designed	and	composed	by	Platonists.
In	my	view	it	is	also	clear	that	the	subsequent	Renaissance	
(using	the	perspective	construction)	so	to	speak	repeats	and	
develops	Plato’s	cave	installation:	observers	see	and	objects	
are	seen,	which	once	again	means	that	the	truth	depends	
on	images	and	the	positions	of	the	observers	and	is	not in­
dependent	of	the	relational	or	relative,	which	Plato	literally	
condemns.	In	extension	of	Plato	and	medieval	Platonists’	
movement	into	space,	towards	the	light,	in	the	Renaissance	
it	becomes	urgent	to	master	space	and	use	visual	art	–	once	
again	by	using	the	presentations	of	visual	art	–	to	show	the	
path	leading	to	the	three­dimensional	harmonious	extent	
that	subsequent	work	on	construction	and	urban	planning	
assumed,	as	if	it	was	an	essential	truth	about	reality.
With	this	three­dimensional	space,	founded	on	propor­
tionality,	but	independent	of	any	size	or	scale,	we	are	very	
close	to	the	spatial	awareness	that	the	Renaissance	shared	
with	Antiquity,	although	spatial	awareness	in	Antiquity	still	
only	related	to	the	proportions	of	individual	objects	and	
not	to	an	idea	of	what	objects	constituted	as	a	single	entity.	
As	indicated	above,	in	Antiquity	people	had	still	not	disco­
vered	a	perspective	capable	of	gathering	and	coordinating	
the	spatiality	of	objects	in	and	with	a	single	common	space	
behind the	picture	plane.	In	Antiquity	spatiality	was	portrayed	
on the	surface,	and	owing	to	the	fact	that	these	portrayals	
had	their	fixed	point	in	the	spatiality	of	individual	objects	
up	and	down	respectively	(cf.	The Sophist above),	both	the	
objects	and	the	common	space	which	thus	arose	between	
them	were	distorted.	And	in	fact	it	is	also	worth	pointing	
out	the	difference	between	the	space	of	Antiquity	and	the	
Renaissance,	thereby	underlining	that	it	was	thanks	to	the	
experiments	of	art	that	culture	achieved	a	dialogue	with	
new	rules,	new	opportunities,	which	art	alone	could	show	
us.	Or	expressed	another	way:	it	should	be	emphasised	that	
it	is	only	in	accordance	with	Plato’s	and	the	Renaissance	
Platonists’	view	that	the	truth	is	unique	and	unchanging	
that	the	difference	between	Antiquity	and	the	Renaissance	
is	concealed;	and	(like	both	Plato	and	the	Renaissance	Pla­
tonists)	we	forget	that	it	was	thanks	to	special	work	with	
images	and	via	the	experiments	of	art	(the	ability	to	present	
space	behind and	not	on the	surface)	that	the	existence	of	
a	harmoniously	proportioned,	rectangular	space	could	be	
outlined	for	a	stationary	observer	in	front	of	the	picture	who	
was	allowed	for	in	the	composition.	And	in	the	Renaissance	
this	extended,	three­dimensional	space	in	harmonious	sta­
sis	was	soon	the	subject	of	particular	interest,	as	if	it	were	
identical	with	the	essence	of	the	world	in	which	the	space	
was	installed.	It	is	true	that	Alberti	wrote	a	treatise	both	on	
visual	art	and	on	architecture,	and	there	is	no	doubt	that	
Alberti	understands	the	essentially	artistic	nature	of	per­
spective.	In	fact	he	was	the	first	one	to	use	language	to	de­
scribe	Brunelleschi’s	perspective	installation.	But	it	is	worth	
pointing	out	that	perspective	does	not	occur	in	Alberti’s	
subsequent	treatise	on	architecture.	This	treatise	contains	
only	directions,	explaining	how	to	work	in	accordance	with	
the	extended	three­dimensional	space	that	perspective	had	
revealed	at	all	stages	from	buildings	to	cities.	And	the	key	
concept	for	the	aesthetic	judgement	is	proportions.	Space	
was	identical	with	geometry.
Rome	was	not	recreated	according	to	Alberti’s	directions	
as	requested,	and	in	general	the	ideal	city	of	the	Renaissance	
did	not	pass	the	planning	stage.	But	on	the	threshold	of	
what	we	now	call	Manierism	–	and	thus	on	the	threshold	of	
the	renewed	task	of	understanding	the	expressions	of	art,	a	
task	which	is	still	ongoing	(just	think	of	the	still	unsatisfac­
tory,	post­modernist	reception	of	Michelangelo)	–	Rafael	
managed	during	the	so­called	High	Renaissance	in	The 
School of Athens	(1509–11) to	unite Plato	and	Aristotle	in	a	
single	space	behind	the	surface,	which	can	be	characterised	
as	a	perspective	of	a	raised	elevation	of	Bramante’s	design	
for	the	Church	of	St.	Peter,	subsequently	changed	radically	
by	Michelangelo.	And	it	did	make	a	difference	although	
we	still	seem	to	have	difficulty	in	understanding	Manierism.	
Even	Robert	Venturi’s	often	excellent	interpretations	of	
Manierism,	which	are	in	close	dialogue	with	his	own	artistic	
development	work,	are	unsatisfactory,	deficient.8	
We	must	not	delve	too	deeply	into	art	history	here.	How­
ever,	it	is	important	for	my	argument	to	point	out	that	the	
Renaissance	shared	with	Plato	the	idea	that	the	world	is	ba­
sically	Euclidian	and	identical	with	the	geometry	by	which	
it	is	measured	and	proportioned.	This	meant	that	like	Plato	
the	Renaissance	was	forgetting	what	we	remember	if	we	are	
aware	that	the	perspective	installation,	and	thereby	all	of	it	
(the	observer’s	position,	the	surface/mirror	and	the	space	
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portrayed	behind	the	surface),	is	the	precondition	and limi­
tation	of	this	space.	The	Renaissance	installation	is	in	the	
world	–	not	the	other	way	round.	And	every	artist	since	
Rafael	and	the	High	Renaissance	seems	to	have	known	that	
as	far	as	perspective	is	concerned	anamorphosis	(distortion)	
is	the	rule,	whereas	the	‘correct’	observer	position	(and	thus	
the	perspectivistic	illusion)	is	the	exception.	And	that	the	
rectangular,	harmonious	space	is	an	abstraction	that	we	
only	experience	approximately	and	thanks	to	abstraction	
from	our	senses.	As	pointed	out	by	Michel	Foucault	in	his	
Manet	lecture9,	very	few	artists	in	the	centuries	after	the	
Renaissance	were	interested	in	revealing	this	knowledge,	
which	is	why	they	explore	and	develop	the	ability	to	port­
ray	what	we	see	on	a	surface	so	objectively	or	seductively	
that	we	simply	forget	to	consider	our	own	observer’s	posi­
tion.	And	even	though	it	is	true	that	art	(and	a	great	deal	of	
fantastic,	innovative	art)	has	been	created	in	and	with	this	
ambition,	I	believe	(as	indicated	in	my	introduction)	that	
Plato’s	scepticism	with	regard	to	illusory	art	and	the	merely	
pretentious	is	still	relevant	–	even	though	such	scepticism	
should	be	connected	these	days	with	explicit	understanding	
of	the	installatory,	the	performative	and	the	compositional,	
which	reflection	has	always	learned	about	from	art.
It	should	be	added	that	Eco	underlines	the	importance	
of	Baroque	architecture,	which	with	its	
search	for	kinetic	excitement	and	illusory	effect	leads	to	a	
situation	where	the	plastic	mass	in	the	Baroque	work	of	art	
never	allows	a	privileged,	definitive,	frontal	view;	rather,	it	
induces	the	spectator	to	shift	his	position	continuously	in	
order	to	see	the	work	in	constantly	new	aspects,	as	if	it	were	
in	a	state	of	perpetual	transformation.10
But	also	that	he	underlines	that	in	the	spiritual	life	of	the	
Baroque	there	is	no awareness	of	what	we	(retrospectively,	
with	our	attention	directed	at	the	dialogue	between	the	
work	and	the	observer)	know	the	art	and	the	architecture	
of	the	epoch	were	on	the	track	of.	Eco:	
In	fact,	it	would	be	rash	to	interpret	Baroque	poetics	as	a	
conscious	theory	of	the	“open	work”.11
In	the	Manet	lecture	mentioned	above,	Foucault	points	out	
that	Edouard	Manet	inaugurated	modern	art	because	in	
his	painting	Manet	works	with	and	alienates	the	observer’s	
position	–	and	in	the	picture	alienates	and	works	with	the	
actual	flatness	and	framework	of	paintings	–	thereby	giving	
us	an	understanding	partly	of	the	fact	that	what	we	see	in	a	
painting	is	not	a	mirror	image	of	the	world	in	which	we	find	
ourselves	as	observers;	and	partly	of	the	fact	that	art	and	its	
installations	are in	a	world	we	do	not	know	in	its	essence,	
and	which	is	far	more	complex	than	we	have	believed	until	
now12.	In	his	famous	painting	A Bar at the Folies­Bergère	
(1881–82),	Manet	shows	us	that	the	person	in	the	mirror	be­
hind	the	picture	plane	(behind	the	barmaid	in	the	middle	
distance)	cannot be	a	mirror	image	of	the	observer	in	front	
of	the	surface	of	the	painting;	and	according	to	Foucault	
this	is	not	a	proposal	that	we	should	give	up	on	art	or	give	
up	our	work	with	and	reflection	on	the	complexity	which	
art	shows	us.	On	the	contrary:	it	is	once	again	via	art	that	
we	gain	the	opportunity	to	deal	with	our	prejudices	–	and	
once	again	it	is	art	that	shows	us	opportunities	we	must	
grasp	(but	carefully,	and	without	persuading	ourselves	that	
the	change	means	we	must	now	throw	everything	else	over­
board).	Even	though	we	learn	that	space	is	not	the	same	as	
either	perspectivistic	illusion	or	Euclidian	geometry,	it	is	
still	true	that	geometry	and	the	proportional	can	be	a	single	
clarifying	factor	in	the	exploration	and	creation	of	space.	
But	geometry	and	attention	to	proportions	are	now	only	a	
corrective	element,	because	we	can	no	longer	fool	ourselves	
into	believing	that	space	and	the	things	we	are	searching	
for	and	creating	can	be	comprised	or	contained	by	a	well­
proportioned	geometry.13
Ever	since	Manet	–	and	ever	since	the	scientific	progress	
we	can	attribute	to	Einstein,	Bohr	and	others	–	we	no	longer	
accept	that	space	and	the	things	we	are	searching	for	and	
creating	can	be	comprised	or	contained	by	the	proportional.	
We	no	longer	share	the	idea	of	the	Renaissance	that	space	is	
Euclidian,	but	can	among many other things avail	ourselves	
of	Euclid	in	working	with	a	complexity	that	among many 
other things includes	awareness	of	the	observer	–	something	
which	the	Renaissance	forgot	but	Manet	remembered.	I	
add	among many other things to	underline	that	we	are	no	
longer	content	to	vary	the	truth	with	the	observer	that	Manet	
once	again	drew	our	attention	to.	As	in	installation	art,	in	
architecture	we	wish	to	create	a	great	number	of	observer	
positions,	a	great	number	of	movement	options,	many	dif­
ferent	relations.	To	paraphrase	Gilles	Deleuze’s	modern,	
retrospective	Baroque	ideas,	we	could	say	that	we	are	inter­
ested	not	so	much	in	varying	the	truth	in	accordance	with	
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a	subject	as	in	establishing	the	preconditions	allowing	the	
truth	of	variations	to	reveal	itself	to	the	subject	as	fields	of	
opportunity14.	And	it	seems	to	me	that	this	ambition	is	
congenial	to	Eco’s	poetics	for	the	open	work.	
A	little	later	in	Eco’s	text	he	mentions	two	significant,	
text­based	examples	of	art	operating	with	an	understand­
ing	that	text	is	tissue	–	in	other	words,	that	the	subject	has	
the	chance	with	the	tissue	of	a	text	to	work	with	the	truth	
of	variation	that	transcends	what	the	author	can	maintain	
from	a	single	viewpoint	or	observer	position.	One	of	these	
examples	is	Mallarmé’s	Livre,	which	(as	pointed	out	by	Eco)	
probably	has	ambitions	reminiscent	of	those	of	late	scho­
lastics,	but	which	unlike	
the	closed,	single	conception	in	a	work	by	a	medieval	artist,	
[which]	reflected	the	conception	of	the	cosmos	as	a	hier­
archy	of	fixed,	preordained	orders	(…)	obviously	suggests	
the	universe	as	it	is	conceived	by	modern,	non­Euclidean	
geometries.15	
The	work,	with	which	Mallarmé	worked	in	a	cultural	circle	
that	also	comprised	Manet,	was	never	completed;	but	it	
is	emphasised	by	Eco	because	in	his	Livre,	consisting	of	a	
finite	number	of	interchangeable	sheets	of	paper,	Mallarmé	
wished	to	understand	and	show	us	how	a	limited	number	of	
structural,	moveable	elements	could	make	an	astronomical	
number	of	combinations	possible.	This	was	by	no	means	a	
homage	to	the	arbitrary	and	rule­less,	but	an	attempt	to	lib­
erate	language	from	the	centred	and	centring	viewpoint	and	
allow	it	to	work	in	a	field	of	many	different	viewpoints.
Mallarmé’s	attempt	did	not	succeed	–	he	had	to	give	up	on	
his	work.	But	he	shared	this	ambition	to	create	texts	that	draw	
on	language	as	a	material,	a	tissue	capable	of	binding	some­
thing	which	is	highly	varied	into	a	single	composition,	with	
James	Joyce	and	Ulysses, which	is	also	emphasised	by	Eco:
The	“Wandering	Rocks”	chapter	in	Ulysses	amounts	to	a	tiny	
universe	that	can	be	viewed	from	different	perspectives:	the	
last	residue	of	Aristotelian	categories	has	now	disappeared.	
(....)	Joyce	has	practised	a	great	deal	of	technical	inventive­
ness	to	introduce	us	to	the	elements	of	his	story	in	such	a	
way	that	it	enables	us	to	find	our	own	paths:	I	doubt	very	
much	whether	a	human	memory	is	able	to	satisfy	all	the	
demands	made	by	Ulysses on	a	first	reading.	And	when	we	
read	it	again,	we	can	start	from	any	point	at	all,	as	if	we	were	
faced	with	something	solid	and	fixed	like	a	city	which	really	
exists	in	space,	and	which	we	can	enter	from	any	direction	
we	please.	While	writing	his	book,	Joyce	said	that	he	was	
working	on	all	its	various	parts	at	the	same	time.16
	
What	seems	to	interest	Eco	in	these	open,	text­based	works	
–	and	what	I	have	noticed	in	particular	–	is	the	opportu­
nity	to	connect	their	authors/readers	in	a	dialogue	with	a	
polycentric,	multifaceted	truth,	the	truth	of	variation.	In	
extension	of	this,	the	ambition	will	be	to	create	texts	that	
enter	into	dialogue	with	artistic	development	work	by	de­
veloping	(in	parallel,	so	to	speak)	opportunities	to	think,	
understand	and	assess	what	development	work	wishes	to	
show	in	its	material	as	compositional	opportunities.	And	
this	research	ambition:	the	wish	to	work	in	language	with	
conscious	awareness	of	e.g.	the	installatory,	performative	
and	compositional	as	an	opportunity	to	process	space	in	and	
with	the	tissue	of	text,	which	can	remember more	than	the	
human	memory,	is	reminiscent	of	the	relationship	between	
art	and	science	which	Eco	emphasises	as	a	special	feature	of	
our	times,	characterised	by	
structural homologies	[which]	need	not	commit	us	to	as­
sembling	a	rigorous	parallelism.	(…)	Thus,	the	concepts	of	
“openness”	and	dynamism	may	recall	the	terminology	of	
quantum	physics:	indeterminacy	and	discontinuity.	But	at	
the	same	time	they	also	exemplify	a	number	of	situations	in	
Einsteinian	physics.17	
The	field	of	potential	cooperation	between	artistic	develop­
ment	work	and	philosophical	aesthetics,	which	I	have	at­
tempted	to	identify	under	the	influence	of	Eco,	is	a	field	in	
which	the	resources	of	cautious	philosophical	aesthetics	are	
still	relevant;	although	its	history	(and	art)	should	by	now	
have	taught	it	that	cooperation	has	always	required	that	it	
should	preferably allow	reflection	to	work	in	and	with	the	
tissue	of	the	text	in	order	to	reflectively	understand	and	
assess	the	potentials	of	art	installations,	rather than lead­
ing	the	text	on	towards	a	single	literal	conclusion	which	it	
already	possessed	in	advance.	Nonetheless,	authors	today	
know	that	even	though	the	point	of	a	text	is	contained	and	
varied	in	its	tissue	and	does	not	need	to	occur	in	the	form	
of	a	conclusion	towards	the	end,	a	text	like	any	other	work	
should	on	the	one	hand	be	judged	on	its	precision,	its	un­
derstanding	of	differences	and	of	the	fact	that	things	matter,	
and	on	the	other	constitute	a	delimited	field	marked	by	a	
concluding	full­stop.
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replace	this	material	space	in	which	paintings	were	grounded	by	
a	represented	space	which	in	a	way	denied	the	space	in	which	
the	painter	painted.	And	it	is	in	this	way	that	painting	since	
quattrocento	has	tried	to	represent	the	three	dimensions	while	
being	grounded	on	a	plane	in	two	dimensions.	(...)	What	Ma­
net	has	done	(and	this	is	certainly	one	aspect	of	the	important	
modifications	Manet	has	contributed	to	Western	painting)	is	to	
make	material	properties,	qualities	or	limitations	reveal	them­
selves	once	again	within	whatever	is	represented	in	a	painting,	
and	which	paintings	had	previously	sought	to	delete	or	mask	in	
some	way	or	other.”	Michel	Foucault,	op.	cit.,	p.	22–23.
13.	 In	2003	Philip	Boudon	republished	Sur	l’espace	architectural.	
When	this	book	was	originally	published	in	1971,	it	described	
the	basis	of	what	was	known	as	Architecturology:	a	theory	
about	the	conception	of	architecture	which	has	since	generated	
a	wide	range	of	research	publications,	but	which	has	still	had	
little	influence	on	Scandinavian	architectural	research.	The	de­
cisive	feature	of	Boudon’s	theory	is	the	importance	of	scale	in	
the	understanding	of	architecture.	In	republishing	Sur	l’espace	
architectural,	Boudon	wrote	a	new	preface	in	which	he	under­
lines	that	a	theory	of	the	creation	of	architecture	cannot	allow	a	
proportional,	geometric	space	to	form	its	framework.	On	the	
other	hand,	frequently	unreflected	but	assumed	geometric	space	
has	constituted	an	epistemological	barrier	to	the	understanding	
of	the	spaces	that	architecture	creates	today.	Consequently,	the	
proportional	must	not	be	assumed	as	the	first	thing,	something	
which	scale	will	subsequently	adjust.	Instead,	the	understanding	
of	scale	–	or	scales	–	must	be	the	first	aspect	of	the	theory,	which	
proportional	considerations	may	subsequently	define	in	greater	
detail.	In	this	connection	I	believe	it	is	relevant	to	point	out	that	
the	understanding	of	scales,	of	the	concrete	formats	of	art	and	
architecture	which	interest	Foucault	and	Boudon	–	and	which	
art	since	the	quattrocento	and	until	Manet	sought	to	conceal	–	is	
also	the	controlling	feature	of	David	Summer’s	re­interpretation	
of	art	history,	as	presented	in	the	impressive	and	inspiring	Real	
Spaces	in	2003.
14.	 Cf.	Gilles	Deleuze,	Le	pli,	Leibniz	et	le	baroque,	Paris	1988,	
which	points	out	on	page	27,	for	instance:	“It	is	true	that	
perspectivism	in	Leibniz	as	well	as	Nietzsche	(...)	is	a	form	
of	relativism,	but	not	relativism	as	it	is	generally	understood.	
What	is	involved	is	not	a	variation	of	the	truth	in	accordance	
with	a	subject,	but	the	conditions	under	which	the	truth	of	
variation	appears	to	the	subject”.
15.	 Op.	cit.,	p.	13	(…)	14.
16.	 Ibid.	p.	10.	The	first	part	of	the	quotation	is	taken	from	the	
English	translation,	the	second	part	from	the	Danish:	Um­
berto	Eco,	“Det	åbne	værks	poetik”,	in	Jørgen	Dehs	(ed.),	
Æstetiske	teorier,	p.	109.	While	the	Danish	version	is	a	trans­
lation	of	Opera	aperta	2.ed,	where	Eco	has	added	the	latter	
part	of	the	quotation	the	English	version	is	a	translation	of	
the	almost	identical	1.ed..
17.	 Ibid.	p.	18.
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space.	This	framework	may	be	sufficient	to	present	Venturi’s	
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